Rspaight wrote: That's what I mean by different levels of self-awareness. Defining "free will" is difficult because not everyone perceives the same thing as "free will." In any event, it's impossible to say objectively whether "free will" is an illusion because we cannot objectively assess it.
While I was thinking about this and how to respond, I realized that these questions have been pondered many times over the centuries by minds superior to my own. So rather than trying to reinvent the wheel, I thought it would be best (as a starting point, at least) to consider arguments that have already been made.
IMO the phrase "free will" is redundant since the will cannot exist without at least a degree of freedom. The action of a salmon swimming upstream to spawn does resemble very "willful" behavior, but since the salmon is slavishly obeying instinct it cannot be thought of as exercising will. If we define will as "the determination to actualize desire," then "desire" must be understood as a dynamic entity that we constantly adjust according to our individual perceptions of reality, not as a static entity that is programmed into us. Of course, humans do have biological urges (the subconscious mind), but these are under (at least partial) control by the will (the conscious mind), which is (at least partially) independent of these urges.
Personally, I think it's all biology...
Would it be accurate to say that you are a determinist (all events have causes)? Your statement reminds me of reductionism, which goes roughly as follows: philosophy can be successfully reduced to psychology, which can be reduced to biology, which can be reduced to chemistry, which can be reduced to physics. In other words, all phenomena, regardless of how complex, are determined or even theoretically
predicted by physical laws.
This raises a number of paradoxes, namely “If my actions have been determined, am I free? If I am not free, am I responsible for my actions? If I am not responsible for my actions, then are the concepts of praise, blame, morals, and ethics meaningless?" Some of these paradoxes are discussed
here.
"Soft” determinists do accept the concepts of praise and blame, and therefore the compatibility of will with determinism. They attempt to explain the paradox this way: since all events are sufficiently (completely) caused, all of our decisions, regardless of which we choose to make, are also sufficiently caused (by various internal and external causes). As long they are not
compelled, they are “free.” I put free in quotes since determinists posit that there is only one possible outcome due to sufficient cause. In addition, they posit that true freedom is a practical impossibility, due to the numerous factors (heredity, environment, etc.) that constantly exert influence over us.
Determinists reject the concept of “first cause” or (“causeless cause”) for two reasons. The first reason is that it implies a supernatural agent that is independent of empirical causes (physical laws), and the second is that a “causeless cause” is simply a rewording of random, which is a very weak definition of freedom as applied to the will.
If you're positing a source for "will" outside the physical body, that's serious metaphysical stuff.
I feel that I can now articulate my view.
Like the soft determinists, I accept the concept of responsibility for our actions as a necessary one. But while I agree with their view that idealized, true freedom to act (freedom from all cause) is a practical impossibility, I reject their idea of a (pre)determined result, which IMO concludes that all freedom is an illusion.
I subscribe to Kant’s definition of freedom to act, which is “spontaneous originality, or the ability to initiate a new causal series.” I would take that a step further in that I recognize degrees of freedom, which would be reflected in the size, if you will, of the resulting new causal series.
Kant's idea is clearly a “first cause” idea. How does Kant counter the two objections of the determinists?
Kant acknowledges man’s ability to reason and defines reason as “dealing with the possibility and not actuality of experience.” It deals with ideas, with what ought to be, and can consider what is not, what has not been, and what could be, or couldn’t be. By contrast, the (empirical) physical world is determined by physical processes, which are completely defined by “what was” and “what is.” Therefore, the ability to reason cannot exist in the reality that we perceive, or empirical reality.
If we accept this, than we can also reject the argument that a causeless cause is necessarily random. Since reason does not exist in empirical reality, we cannot definitively apply concepts that are based on empirical reality.
Kant thought of empirical reality as an incomplete picture of the true reality of the material universe, and that reason existed in the portion of reality (a different plane) that we cannot perceive. By doing so, it seems like he was trying to avoid stating that reason necessarily has its origins in the supernatural. I think that reason, and consciousness, do have their origins in the supernatural (or spiritual). This type of thinking is a part of
dualism.
