Tower Records Restates First-Half Income
Posted: Sat Jun 21, 2003 4:24 pm
Courtesy of Reuters....
Tower Records Restates First-Half Income
Sat June 21, 2003 03:21 PM ET
By Ed Christman
NEW YORK (Billboard) - Tower Records continues to perform a high-wire act.
As if putting the chain up for sale while juggling negotiations with bondholders to convert that debt into equity wasn't enough high drama for its nervous suppliers, Tower on June 16 announced a wider third-quarter loss and surprised the industry by restating income for its first two quarters.
Tower's third-quarter financials show that the company lost $13.8 million on sales of $122 million in the quarter ended April 30, compared with the $8.6 million loss it had in the corresponding period in the previous year, when sales were $137.5 million.
At the same time, Tower restated the results of its first and second fiscal quarters, which eliminated the only profitable quarter it had posted in the past three years. Initially, Tower reported a first-quarter profit of $23 million, thanks to the $37.4 million it made in selling its Japanese chain for about $124 million last Oct. 11.
But Tower incorrectly calculated the sale's profit and had to restate earnings on that deal at $15.8 million because of the reclassification of the Japanese subsidiary's accumulated comprehensive loss. As a result, Tower instead shows a net loss of $1.1 million for its fiscal first quarter ended Oct. 31, 2002.
Consequently, Tower had to amend the results in its six-month numbers for the period ended Jan. 31 to a net loss of $26 million, as opposed to the $5.8 million it previously showed for that period. So, when looking at nine-month numbers, Tower now shows a net loss of $39.8 million on sales of $428.9 million.
The third-quarter 10-Q filing also shows that the company had drawn down $53.3 million of its $100 million facility, leaving $24.2 million in availability, based on the loan's collateral lending formula. But with a loan reserve of $15 million, that leaves Tower with $9.2 million to access before it slips into technical default if it draws down more. That slim availability once again places suppliers at the edge of their seats.
Tower's bondholders are also nervous. The company recently decided to forgo the $5 million interest payment that was due on the debentures June 1, after a one-month grace period elapsed from the original May 1 due date. That could have put Tower in default on its revolving credit facility. But on June 10, Tower made a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, stating, in effect, that its lender, CIT Group/Business Credit, will give the chain until Sept. 30 to comply with the loan.
Meanwhile, Lloyd Greif -- president/CEO of Los Angeles-based Greif & Co., which is shopping the chain -- makes it sound like interested parties are lining up outside his door.
The appearance of a buyer would certainly induce Tower's bondholders to make the debt-to-equity swap. But given that Best Buy had to literally give away Musicland to be free of the troubled chain last week, some vendor financial executives wonder if a Tower sale would be any easier, even if it has a better-known brand.
With all eyes glued to those multiple story lines, some financial executives in the independent label community say they fear that next, bondholders or a potential buyer could try and force suppliers to forgive Tower some product payments -- or, in the parlance of the music industry, "take a haircut." But major-label financial executives say they would aggressively resist anything that even remotely resembles that strategy.
They point out that whomever owns Tower will need the majors' support going forward, which is why a prepackaged Chapter 11 wouldn't work. And in an outright Chapter 11 filing, the bondholders would lose any possible reward that a Tower sale might bring, because they would be in the same class as the rest of the unsecured creditors.
The upside for bondholders is that if they get, say, 80% of the company's equity -- because most of them bought into the debentures when they were in the 15 cent-20 cent (on the dollar) range -- they could make a nice profit if a sale were to realize, say, in excess of $50 million. The risk in converting to equity is that Tower may still ultimately fail and file Chapter 11, which would probably wipe out all equity.
Reuters/Billboard
http://asia.reuters.com/newsArticle.jht ... ID=2966692
Tower Records Restates First-Half Income
Sat June 21, 2003 03:21 PM ET
By Ed Christman
NEW YORK (Billboard) - Tower Records continues to perform a high-wire act.
As if putting the chain up for sale while juggling negotiations with bondholders to convert that debt into equity wasn't enough high drama for its nervous suppliers, Tower on June 16 announced a wider third-quarter loss and surprised the industry by restating income for its first two quarters.
Tower's third-quarter financials show that the company lost $13.8 million on sales of $122 million in the quarter ended April 30, compared with the $8.6 million loss it had in the corresponding period in the previous year, when sales were $137.5 million.
At the same time, Tower restated the results of its first and second fiscal quarters, which eliminated the only profitable quarter it had posted in the past three years. Initially, Tower reported a first-quarter profit of $23 million, thanks to the $37.4 million it made in selling its Japanese chain for about $124 million last Oct. 11.
But Tower incorrectly calculated the sale's profit and had to restate earnings on that deal at $15.8 million because of the reclassification of the Japanese subsidiary's accumulated comprehensive loss. As a result, Tower instead shows a net loss of $1.1 million for its fiscal first quarter ended Oct. 31, 2002.
Consequently, Tower had to amend the results in its six-month numbers for the period ended Jan. 31 to a net loss of $26 million, as opposed to the $5.8 million it previously showed for that period. So, when looking at nine-month numbers, Tower now shows a net loss of $39.8 million on sales of $428.9 million.
The third-quarter 10-Q filing also shows that the company had drawn down $53.3 million of its $100 million facility, leaving $24.2 million in availability, based on the loan's collateral lending formula. But with a loan reserve of $15 million, that leaves Tower with $9.2 million to access before it slips into technical default if it draws down more. That slim availability once again places suppliers at the edge of their seats.
Tower's bondholders are also nervous. The company recently decided to forgo the $5 million interest payment that was due on the debentures June 1, after a one-month grace period elapsed from the original May 1 due date. That could have put Tower in default on its revolving credit facility. But on June 10, Tower made a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, stating, in effect, that its lender, CIT Group/Business Credit, will give the chain until Sept. 30 to comply with the loan.
Meanwhile, Lloyd Greif -- president/CEO of Los Angeles-based Greif & Co., which is shopping the chain -- makes it sound like interested parties are lining up outside his door.
The appearance of a buyer would certainly induce Tower's bondholders to make the debt-to-equity swap. But given that Best Buy had to literally give away Musicland to be free of the troubled chain last week, some vendor financial executives wonder if a Tower sale would be any easier, even if it has a better-known brand.
With all eyes glued to those multiple story lines, some financial executives in the independent label community say they fear that next, bondholders or a potential buyer could try and force suppliers to forgive Tower some product payments -- or, in the parlance of the music industry, "take a haircut." But major-label financial executives say they would aggressively resist anything that even remotely resembles that strategy.
They point out that whomever owns Tower will need the majors' support going forward, which is why a prepackaged Chapter 11 wouldn't work. And in an outright Chapter 11 filing, the bondholders would lose any possible reward that a Tower sale might bring, because they would be in the same class as the rest of the unsecured creditors.
The upside for bondholders is that if they get, say, 80% of the company's equity -- because most of them bought into the debentures when they were in the 15 cent-20 cent (on the dollar) range -- they could make a nice profit if a sale were to realize, say, in excess of $50 million. The risk in converting to equity is that Tower may still ultimately fail and file Chapter 11, which would probably wipe out all equity.
Reuters/Billboard
http://asia.reuters.com/newsArticle.jht ... ID=2966692